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No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
-Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Section 1 
 
No person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, . . . be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance. 
- Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
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A recipient may provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower 
facilities on the basis of sex . . .. 
- Implementing regulation of Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972 at 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
On May 13, 2016, the Obama Administration issued a guidance 
document entitled “Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students,” 
which interpreted federal law as requiring that transgender students be 
permitted to use bathrooms that correspond with their gender identity 
in schools receiving federal funding.  Considerable litigation ensued. 
Less than a year later, on February 22, 2017, the Trump Administration 
rescinded this guidance document.  The Trump Administration asserts 
that it should be up to individual states to decide what bathrooms 
transgender children may use in schools. 
This article addresses where transgender bathroom rights stand 
now that Obama’s Dear Colleague Letter has been rescinded, as well 
as what the decision of the Supreme Court should be in the pending 
transgender bathroom case, Gloucester County School Board v. 
Grimm.  This Article concludes that, even though the student in the case 
has now graduated, the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court should 
issue a decision in the Gloucester County School Board case, and 
should hold that federal law requires that transgender students have 
access to bathrooms that correspond to their gender identity. 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
  
Under Title IX, schools receiving federal funding may not 
discriminate against any “person . . . on the basis of sex.”1  However, 
Title IX does permit sex segregated “living quarters,”2 and the 
regulations issued pursuant to Title IX permit sex segregated bathrooms, 
locker rooms, and changing areas.3  Last year, in May 2016, the Federal 
Government, led by President Obama, issued a guidance document that 
interpreted Title IX to require that students with a male gender identity 
be allowed to use the men’s bathrooms, and that students with a female 
gender identity be allowed to use women’s bathrooms.4  This treatment 
                                                
1 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
2 20 U.S.C. § 1686 (2012). 
3 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (1994). 
4 Catherine E. Lhamon & Vanita Gupta, Dear Colleague Letter on 
Transgender Students, U. S. Dep’t of Justice & Dep’t of Educ. (May 13, 
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of transgender students accords with the most recent recommendations 
from medical and psychiatric experts.5  
However, less than a year later, the Federal Government, led by 
President Trump, rescinded this interpretation of Title IX and its 
regulations.6  This article examines the pending Supreme Court case of 
Gloucester County School Board v. Grimm, and concludes that the 
Supreme Court should rule in favor of the transgender student under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under 
Title IX. Part I of this article discusses the background and current status 
of the Gloucester County School Board v. Grimm case.  Part II discusses 
the recent Seventh Circuit decision in Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified 
School District No. 1 Board of Education7.  Part III shows how the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the 
Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court should decide the Gloucester 
case similarly to the decision in the Whitaker case, and find that schools 
receiving federal funding must allow transgender students to use 
bathrooms that correspond to the gender with which they identify.  This 
article concludes that when the Supreme Court does decide the 
transgender bathroom issue, it should find that both Title IX and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution require 
schools receiving federal funding to permit transgender students access 
to the bathrooms that match their gender identity.  
 
 
                                                
2016), www.ed.gov/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf 
[hereinafter 2016 Dear Colleague Letter]. 
5 See, e.g., Standards of Care, WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER 
HEALTH, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/amo_hub_content/Association140/files/Standards
%20of%20Care%20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH%20(2)(1).pdf (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2017) (stating that transgender individuals should be 
supported and affirmed in their gender identities). 
6 See Letter from Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor Gen., Office of the 
Solicitor General, to Scott S. Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United 
States (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/941546/download; Press Release, Department of Justice, 
Statement by Attorney General Jeff Sessions on the Withdrawal of Title IX 
Guidance (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-
attorney-general-jeff-sessions-withdrawal-title-ix-guidance; Sandra Battle & 
T.E. Wheeler, II, Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ. (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/941551/download [hereinafter 2017 Dear Colleague Letter].  
7 Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 
1034 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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II.   THE BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATUS OF 
GLOUCESTER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD V. GRIMM.  
 
In June 2015, Gavin Grimm (referred to as “G.G.” in all court 
documents prior to May 24, 20178), a 16-year-old student at Gloucester 
High School, brought a lawsuit in federal court in Virginia, alleging that 
his public school, Gloucester High School, refused to allow him access 
to the boys’ bathroom at school, in violation of Title IX and the 
Fourteenth Amendment.9  Gavin is a transgender boy, which means that 
“he was designated female at birth but he has a male gender identity.”10 
Transgender individuals are individuals who identify as a gender 
different from the sex assigned at birth.11  
Gavin and his mother informed his school shortly before his 
sophomore year began that he was transgender and that he wished to be 
treated as a boy in all respects.12  His school was initially supportive and 
allowed him to use the boys’ restroom, which he did for seven weeks 
without incident.13  However, due to complaints by some community 
members, the Gloucester County School Board passed a policy in 
December of Gavin’s sophomore year, which denied transgender 
students access to bathrooms matching their gender identity, and 
required all students to use bathrooms that corresponded to their 
“biological genders.”14  The policy provided that students with “gender 
identity issues” could use “an alternative appropriate private facility.”15  
                                                
8 On May 24, 2017, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals granted an 
unopposed motion to amend the caption of the Fourth Circuit case to Gavin 
Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, due to Gavin no longer being a 
minor.  See Order, Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-2056 (4th Cir. 
May 24, 2017); Unopposed Motion to Amend Case Caption, Grimm v. 
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-2056 (4th Cir. 2017). 
9 Complaint, Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15-cv-00054 (E.D. 
Va. June 11, 2015). On May 16, 2017, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia granted a similar motion made by Gavin. See 
Order, Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15-cv-00054 (E.D. Va. 
May 16, 2017). No such similar request has been made to the Supreme 
Court. 
10 Complaint, supra note 9, at 1. 
11 See Media Reference Guide – Transgender, Gender Identity, GLAAD, 
https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). 
12 Complaint, supra note 9, at 1–2. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 2. 
15 Id.  
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In his complaint, Gavin alleged that he was the only student who 
had to use a separate private restroom, and that it is stigmatizing to have 
to use a separate private restroom when all other students can use the 
multi-stall community bathrooms that are consistent with their gender 
identity.16  Gavin alleged that as a result of the stigma associated with 
using the private restroom he tried to avoid using any bathroom while 
at school.17  As a result of trying to avoid using the restroom, he tried to 
limit his fluid intake and to “hold it” when he needed to urinate.18  As a 
result, Gavin developed multiple urinary tract infections.19  Gavin’s 
complaint alleged violations of both the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972.20  His complaint asked for preliminary and permanent injunctions 
requiring his school to allow him to use the boys’ bathrooms.21 
The District Court found for the school board, reasoning that the 
regulations under Title IX “clearly allow[s] the School Board to limit 
bathroom access 'on the basis of sex,' including birth or biological 
sex.”22  The regulation cited by the District Court can be found at 34 
C.F.R. § 106.33, and provides that schools “may provide separate toilet, 
locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex.”23  The District 
Court also reasoned that the Federal Government’s interpretation of 
Title IX and its regulations should not be deferred to.24  The Federal 
Government had issued an opinion letter a few months prior,25 
interpreting Title IX and its regulations as requiring that schools allow 
transgender students to use the bathrooms that match their gender 
                                                
16 Id. at 2, 11. 
17 Id. at 2. 
18 Id. at 11. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 2. 
21 Id. at 15. 
22 G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 746 
(E.D. Va. 2015). 
23 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (1994). 
24 Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 746.  
25 This opinion letter was written by the United States Department of 
Education Office for Civil Rights and was issued a few months prior to the 
Dear Colleague Letter, but was consistent with the Dear Colleague Letter and 
how the federal government had been interpreting Title IX for several years. 
See Letter from James A. Ferg-Cadima, Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y for 
Policy, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Emily T. Prince (Jan. 
7, 2015), 
http://www.bricker.com/documents/misc/transgender_student_restroom_acce
ss_1-2015.pdf; see also Catherine Jean Archibald, Transgender Bathroom 
Rights, 24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4–5 (2016) (discussing actions of 
the federal government taken pursuant to Title IX). 
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identity.  The District Court reasoned that the Federal Government’s 
interpretation was “clearly erroneous” because the regulations allowing 
schools to provide separate bathrooms “on the basis of sex” could not 
mean “on the basis of gender identity.”26  
Gavin appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
finding that the Federal Government’s interpretation of Title IX and its 
regulations were reasonable and must be deferred to.27  The Fourth 
Circuit reasoned that Title IX and its regulations were silent as to which 
bathrooms transgender students should use.28  The Fourth Circuit 
reasoned that since it was unclear how schools should determine 
whether a transgender student was male or female in determining access 
to sex-segregated bathrooms, the Federal Government’s interpretation 
of Title IX and its regulations reasonably clarified an ambiguity in Title 
IX and its regulations, and should be deferred to.29  The Fourth Circuit 
remanded to the District Court for a decision on the request for a 
preliminary injunction consistent with its decision.30  The District Court 
entered an order for a preliminary injunction, requiring the school to 
allow transgender students to use the bathrooms that match their gender 
identity.31  Gloucester County School Board requested a stay of the 
preliminary injunction until all appeals could be exhausted.32  The 
District Court and the Fourth Circuit denied these requests for a stay,33 
but the Supreme Court granted the request for a stay, until either the 
denial of a timely filed “petition for a writ of certiorari” or, in the case 
of an acceptance by the Court of a petition for a writ of certiorari, until 
“the issuance of the judgment of this Court.”34  
                                                
26 Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 745.  
27 G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 (4th 
Cir. 2016) cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 
1239 (2017). 
28 Id. at 720. 
29 Id. at 723.  
30 Id.  
31 Order at 2, Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 2016 WL 3581852, at *1 
(E.D. Va. June 23, 2016) (No. 4:15-cv-00054), vacated, 853 F.3d 729 (4th 
Cir. 2017), as amended (Apr. 18, 2017). 
32 Defendant’s Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. 
Sch. Bd., No. 4:15-cv-00054 (E.D. Va. June 28, 2016); Appellee’s Motion 
for Stay of Mandate Pending Filing of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Grimm 
v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-2056 (4th Cir. June 7, 2016). 
33 G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 654 F. App’x 606 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(referring to the District Court’s denial of the stay request). 
34 Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016). 
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Gloucester County School Board appealed the case to the 
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case on 
October 28, 2016.35  Oral argument was set for March 28, 2017.36 The 
Trump Administration rescinded the guidance on February 22, 2017.37 
Following the Trump Administration’s rescission of the Obama 
Administration’s guidance document, on March 6, 2017, the Supreme 
Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case back 
to the Fourth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the Trump 
Administration’s action.38  On March 8, 2017, Gavin made a motion for 
expedited briefing and oral argument so that the Fourth Circuit could 
issue a decision before his graduation from high school on June 10, 
2017.39  On April 7, 2017, the Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary 
injunction issued by the district court,40 and denied the plaintiff-
appellant’s motion for expedited briefing and oral argument.41  Oral 
argument in the Fourth Circuit was scheduled for September 2017.42 
Gavin argued that he is still subject to the Board’s policy “whenever on 
school grounds as a guest at homecoming or prom and while attending 
alumni activities, football games, and other community events.”43  The 
Gloucester County School Board argued that the case may be  moot 
because it is unclear whether Title IX applies to non-educational events 
with non-students, and it is unclear whether the Board’s policy on 
bathroom use applies to non-students.44  However, on August 2, 2017, 
the Fourth Circuit remanded the case down to the District Court to 
                                                
35 See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016).  
36 Set For Argument, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 
(2017) (No. 16-273). 
37 2017 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 6. 
38 See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). 
39 Motion for Expedited Briefing and Argument, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. 
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2056). 
40 G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2017). 
41 Order, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2056). 
42 Oral Argument Notification, Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 
729 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-02056) (setting oral argument for September 12, 
2017). 
43 Supplemental Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 12, Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. 
Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-02056). 
44 Supplemental Brief of Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. at 19, Grimm v. 
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-02056). 
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determine “whether this case has become moot[,]”45 and removed the 
case from the oral argument calendar.46  
Gavin then filed an Amended Complaint in the District Court.47 
The Amended Complaint, alleges that “[a]s an alumnus with close ties 
to the community, Gavin will continue to be on school grounds when 
attending football games, alumni activities, or social event with friends 
who are still in high school.”48  The Amended Complaint alleges 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Title IX, and asks for: 1) a declaration that the school’s 
policy violated Gavin’s rights while he was a student; 2) nominal 
damages; 3) a declaration that the school’s policy continues to violate 
Gavin’s rights; and 4) a permanent injunction allowing Gavin to use 
“the same restrooms as other male alumni” of the school.49  
On September 22, 2017, the Gloucester County School Board 
filed a motion to dismiss the case, on the grounds that the Equal 
Protection Clause and Title IX do not require schools to allow 
transgender students access to bathrooms corresponding to their gender 
identity, and that since Gavin has graduated from the school, no 
controversy exists as he is no longer subject to the school’s policy.50  On 
October 26, 2017, the district court ordered the parties to provide 
supplemental briefing on the issue of mootness, and to address such 
questions as “[w]hether Plaintiff intends to visit Gloucester High School 
as an alumnus” and “[w]hether, if Plaintiff visits and uses Gloucester 
High School’s bathrooms, what policies, if any, apply to him, and how 
such policies would be enforced.”51  The court noted that “[d]iscovery 
may be useful to develop the factual record upon which the mootness 
issue will be resolved.”52  However, only a few days later, Gavin filed a 
“Notice of Consent,” voluntarily agreeing to dismiss the requests in his 
Amended Complaint asking for a declaration that the school’s policy 
continues to violate his rights, and asking for a permanent injunction 
                                                
45 Order, Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 15-02056) (remanding case to the district court). 
46 Order, Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 15-02056) (removing case from oral argument calendar). 
47 Amended Complaint, Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, (No. 
4:15-cv-00054) (E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2017). 
48 Id. at 14.  
49 Id. at 17. 
50 Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, Grimm v. 
Gloucester County School Board, (No. 4:15-cv-00054) (E.D. Va. Sept. 22, 
2017). 
51 Order at 1, 6, Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, (No. 4:15-cv-
54) (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2017). 
52 Id. at 6.  
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allowing him to use the male bathrooms at his former school.53  The 
Notice of Consent explains that the request for “a permanent injunction 
and prospective declaratory judgment” are being voluntarily dismissed 
because  
 
[c]ontinuing to pursue [these] claims . . . would require 
the parties and the Court to expend time and resources 
resolving factual questions that would delay and distract 
from the central legal question of whether Defendant 
violated Gavin’s rights under Title IX and the Fourteenth 
Amendment while he was a student at Gloucester High 
School.54  
 
On the same date, Gavin asked the court to vacate its order requiring 
supplemental briefing on the mootness issue.55  Gavin argued that 
because he was no longer seeking relief for current actions of the school, 
but only for past actions of the school, no mootness issue remained.56  
Whichever way the district court decides on the mootness issue or on 
the merits of the case, it is likely that the losing party will appeal the 
case to the Fourth Circuit.  Whichever way the Fourth Circuit may 
decide, it is likely that the losing party will seek to appeal the case back 
to the United States Supreme Court.  If the Supreme Court decides to 
take the case, it has another Circuit Court of Appeal decision on the 
transgender bathroom issue to consider, that of Whitaker v. Kenosha 
Unified School District No. 1.57 
 
III.   THE BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATUS OF 
WHITAKER V. KENOSHA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
1 BOARD OF EDUCATION 
 
In March 2017, the Supreme Court sent the Gloucester School 
Board v. Grimm case back down to the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.58  Shortly afterwards, a different Federal Court of Appeals 
decided a transgender bathroom case in favor of the transgender 
                                                
53 Plaintiff’s Notice of Consent to Dismissal of Requests for Relief (C) and 
(D), Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, (No. 4:15-cv-00054) (E.D. 
Va. Nov. 2, 2017). 
54 Id. at 2. 
55 Motion to Vacate Order for Supplemental Briefing, Grimm v. Gloucester 
County School Board, (No. 4:15-cv-00054) (E.D. Va. Nov. 2, 2017). 
56 Id. at 2–3. 
57 Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 
(7th Cir. 2017). 
58 Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). 
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student.59  In May 2017, in the case of Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified 
School District No. 1, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction issued by the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, that required 
the Kenosha Unified School District to allow a transgender boy, Ashton 
Whitaker, “Ash,” access to the boys’ bathrooms at school. 60  Ash came 
out as transgender to his parents in eighth grade.61  When he began high 
school he publicly identified as a boy and began using the name 
Ashton.62  
During his sophomore year, Ash was informed that the school 
administration had decided that he could only use the girls’ bathroom, 
or a unisex bathroom in the main office.63  Because the unisex bathroom 
was far from his classrooms and he believed being the only student to 
use the unisex bathroom would draw unwanted attention to his 
transgender status, and because he was not comfortable using the girls’ 
bathroom as he identified as a boy, Ash began limiting his intake of 
fluids and avoiding using any bathroom.64  This aggravated a pre-
existing medical condition, and caused him to experience dizziness and 
fainting.65  When needed, Ash used the boys’ bathroom, but was pulled 
out of class several times by school administrators who admonished him 
for using the boys’ bathroom, and reminded him that the only bathrooms 
he was permitted to use were the girls’ bathrooms and the unisex 
bathroom.66  As a result of his school’s unwritten policy, Ash worried 
about being disciplined and how that would affect his college 
applications; he experienced anxiety, depression, and even 
contemplated suicide.67 
Ash brought a case before the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin, and argued in his compliant that his 
school was violating both Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment, by 
not allowing him to use the bathrooms that correspond to his gender 
identity.68  Just after the start of his senior year at high school, the 
District Court granted his request for a preliminary injunction and 
required his school to allow him to use the boys’ bathrooms, forbade his 
                                                
59 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1034. 
60 Id. at 1039.  
61 Id. at 1040. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1041. 
65 Id.   
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 1040–41.  
68 Complaint, Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 
2016 WL 5239829 (E.D. Wis. Jul 19, 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-00943). 
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school for disciplining him for using the boys’ bathrooms, and forbade 
his school from monitoring his bathroom use in any way.69  Ash felt a 
huge sense of relief and used the boys’ bathrooms at school without 
incident for the rest of his senior year at high school.70  Just a few days 
before he finished high school, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the District Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction.71 
In deciding that a preliminary injunction was warranted in this 
situation, the Seventh Circuit examined four factors: 1) the likelihood 
of irreparable harm to Ash if the preliminary injunction was not granted; 
2) the lack of ability of money damages to compensate for the harm Ash 
would suffer if the preliminary injunction was not granted; 3) the 
likelihood that Ash would win this case on the merits; and 4) the balance 
of harm to Ash if the injunction was not issued versus the harm to the 
public and the school district if the injunction was issued.72 
On the first factor, the Seventh Circuit noted that the District Court’s 
finding that Ash would suffer irreparable harm was well supported by 
the evidence, which included expert opinions that not permitting Ash to 
use the boys’ restrooms would undermine his gender transition and 
significantly negatively impact “his mental health and overall well-
being.”73  The expert psychologist’s opinion was that the school’s 
bathroom policy singled out Ash as different and put him at risk for 
serious psychological distress and “at risk for experiencing life-long 
diminished well-being and life-functioning.”74 
On the second factor, the Seventh Circuit upheld the District 
Court’s finding that monetary damages at the end of litigation could not 
adequately compensate the potential harm that Ash would face were he 
not awarded a preliminary injunction, because money would not be 
adequate to compensate for Ash’s potential suicide or “life-long 
diminished well-being and life-functioning.”75  
On the third factor, the Seventh Circuit found that Ash had 
“established a probability of success on the merits of his Title IX claim” 
                                                
69 Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., No. 16-CV-
943-PP, 2016 WL 5239829, at *1, *18 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 22, 2016), aff'd 
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 
1039 (7th Cir. 2017). 
70 See Mark Joseph Stern, A Trans Teen Explains Why He Took His School to 
Court (and Won), SLATE, (June 13, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/06/13/ash_whitaker_discusses_tra
nsgender_lawsuit_and_7th_circuit_victory.html. 
71 Id.; Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1039. 
72 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1044. 
73 Id. at 1045. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1046. 
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because his school’s policy of requiring him to use a bathroom that he 
did not identify with “punishe[d him] for his . . . gender non-
conformance”76 which is prohibited by Title IX because the sex 
discrimination forbidden by Title IX includes discrimination “based on 
a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.”77  
Also on the third factor, the Seventh Circuit addressed Ash’s 
Equal Protection claim and found that he had shown likely success on 
this claim.78  The court reasoned that the school’s bathroom policy was 
based on sex because the policy “cannot be stated without referencing 
sex, as the School District decides which bathroom a student may use 
based upon the sex listed on the student’s birth certificate.”79  Because 
classifications based on sex are subjected to heightened scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause and can only be upheld if the government 
actor (here, the public school) shows an “exceedingly persuasive” 
justification, the court examined the school’s justifications, and found 
them unpersuasive.80  
Addressing the school’s argument that Ash’s use of the boys’ 
bathroom interfered with other boys’ privacy interests, the court noted 
that the record contained no evidence that any student had complained 
about Ash’s bathroom use.81  Further, the court noted that the school’s 
policy “does nothing to protect the privacy rights of each individual 
student vis-à -vis students who share similar anatomy and it ignores the 
practical reality of how Ash, as a transgender boy, uses the bathroom: 
by entering a stall and closing the door.”82  The court also reasoned that 
“[c]ommon sense tells us that the communal restroom is a place where 
individuals act in a discreet manner to protect their privacy and those 
who have true privacy concerns are able to utilize a stall.”83   
Finally, the court reasoned if the school’s interest was to have 
separate bathrooms for children who did not look anatomically the 
same, then it would have had separate bathrooms for pre-pubescent and 
post-pubescent children, who also do not look anatomically the same.84 
Finding all the school’s justifications for its bathroom policy 
                                                
76 Id. at 1048–50. 
77 Id. (quoting Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)). 
78 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1050–51. 
79 Id. at 1051. 
80 Id. at 1052 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1052. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1052–53. 
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unpersuasive, the Seventh Circuit found that Ash had shown a 
likelihood of success on his Equal Protection claim.85  
Finally, on factor four of the preliminary injunction test, the 
Seventh Circuit upheld the District Court’s determination that granting 
a preliminary injunction was the correct decision when looking at the 
balance of harms to Ash, the school district, and the public.86  The court 
reasoned that Ash had used the boys’ bathrooms at school for six months 
without any complaints by students that they felt their privacy had been 
infringed.87  The court also noted that the amici statements of school 
administrators from 21 states and the District of Columbia that had 
implemented school bathroom policies allowing transgender students to 
use bathrooms that matched their gender identity had experienced no 
harm from doing so.88 
Thus, having examined all four preliminary injunction factors 
and finding that Ash showed a likelihood of irreparable harm if the 
preliminary injunction was not ordered, finding that monetary damages 
after the fact would not adequately compensate Ash for his injuries if 
the preliminary injunction was not issued, finding that Ash had shown 
a likelihood of success on his Title IX and Equal Protection Claims, and 
finding that in looking at the balance of the harms to the parties and the 
public, preliminary injunction was warranted, the Seventh Circuit 
upheld the District Court’s award of a preliminary injunction to Ash.89 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the 
Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court, should it decide to take the case, 
should decide Gavin Grimm’s case similarly to the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Whitaker. 
 
IV.   THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN 
DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE IN FAVOR OF THE 
TRANSGENDER STUDENT IN GLOUCESTER COUNTY 
SCHOOL BOARD V. GRIMM.  
 
Gavin Grimm’s case is almost identical to Ashton Whitaker’s, with 
the difference being that the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit will make their upcoming 
decisions after Gavin has graduated high school, whereas the Seventh 
Circuit made its decision while Ashton was still a high school student. 
                                                
85 Id. at 1054. 
86 Id. at 1054–55. 
87 Id. at 1054. 
88 Id. at 1054–55. 
89 Id. at 1055. 
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However, as discussed below, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, the Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court 
should decide the case in Gavin’s favor because: 1) his case is not moot; 
and 2) Gavin’s Equal Protection and Title IX rights were violated by his 
school.  
 
A.   The Case is Not Moot 
 
Although Gavin Grimm graduated on June 10, 2017, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the Fourth 
Circuit, and the Supreme Court should hear and decide his case as the 
case is not moot. Under Article III of the United States Constitution, 
federal courts have jurisdiction over various types of “cases” and 
“controversies.”90  Federal courts have interpreted this case-or-
controversy requirement to mean that both parties must demonstrate a 
“personal stake” in the case.91  A case becomes moot when one or both 
parties “lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome” of the case.92  
Additionally, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the requirements 
for a case becoming moot are stricter than the requirements for a party 
to have standing to bring a case in the first place.93  This is because while 
the “[s]tanding doctrine ensures . . . that the resources of the federal 
courts are devoted to disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake 
. . . by the time mootness is an issue, abandonment of the case may prove 
more wasteful than frugal.”94  This principle applies “particularly in a 
case that has been litigated up to [the Supreme] Court and back down 
again . . . mootness would be justified only if it were absolutely clear 
that the litigant no longer had any need of the judicial protection that it 
sought.”95  Thus, although mootness may be found if a party clearly has 
no interest in the litigation, so long as the court can make a ruling that 
will “affect the rights of [the] litigants” before it, the case is not moot.96 
                                                
90 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
91 See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 
(1980) (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755 (1976); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
92 Cty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). 
93 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 
U.S. 167, 191–92 (2000). 
94 Id. 
95 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 224 (2000). 
96 Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (quoting North 
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)). 
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Put another way, “as long as the parties have a concrete interest, 
however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.”97 
In addition, a party may claim nominal damages on the basis of a past 
constitutional deprivation.98  Thus, even when a student’s claim for 
injunctive relief is mooted by a student’s graduation, a claim for 
damages based on a past violation of a constitutional right will keep the 
case alive.99  
A student’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief from her 
school will be mooted by her graduation if she will not suffer similar 
harm in the position of an alumnus as she alleges she suffered as a 
student.100  However, her claim for damages caused by the past alleged 
violation of her rights will not be moot.101  In Mellen v. Bunting, students 
at the Virginia Military Institute sued the superintendent of their school, 
alleging that the supper prayer they were forced to sit through before 
eating dinner was unconstitutional because it was in violation of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.102  The students asked 
for declaratory, injunctive, and damage relief.103  Because the students 
had graduated and no longer had to sit through the supper prayers by the 
time the case reached it, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ injunctive and declaratory relief 
claims were moot, but not their claim for damages.104  Thus, the court 
                                                
97 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307–08 
(2012) (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 442 (1984)).   
98 See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11 
(1986) (nominal damages are appropriate for past violations of constitutional 
rights where no injury beyond the rights violation is shown); Pucket v. 
Rounds, CIV. 03-5033-KES, 2006 WL 120233, at *6 (D.S.D. Jan. 17, 2006) 
(claim for nominal damages against school district based on alleged past 
constitutional violation not moot even though students had already graduated 
from school). 
99 See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 393–94 (1981); Fox v. 
Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ., 42 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that 
“relief in the form of damages for a past violation of . . . constitutional rights 
is not adversely affected by [a student’s graduation].”).  
100 See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 2003); Bd. of Sch. 
Comm'rs of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129 (1975) (student 
newspaper editors’ First Amendment claims against school mooted by 
students’ graduation). 
101 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 365. 
102 Id. at 363.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 364–65. 
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reached the First Amendment claim, and found that the supper prayer 
was unconstitutional.105 
A child’s claim for nominal damages due to a school’s 
constitutional violation will not be mooted by the child leaving the 
school.106  In American Humanist Association. v. Greenville County 
School District, plaintiffs were students and parents challenging as 
unconstitutional several religious practices and policies of the students’ 
schools, such as holding school events in religious venues.107 During the 
litigation, the students and parents moved to a different state and so no 
longer attended the schools in question.108  The Fourth Circuit held that 
the claim for nominal damages was not moot as the plaintiffs’ claimed 
injury was due to past constitutional violations that the court could 
compensate with an award of nominal damages.109 
If a student fails to make a request for damages in her complaint, 
a court will not “read a damages claim into” a request for damages when 
deciding that that case is moot.110  In Fox v. Board of Trustees of The 
State University of New York, some students sued their university, 
alleging that the university’s policy of prohibiting sales demonstrations 
in student rooms violated their constitutional free speech rights.111 
During the adjudication of the case, the students graduated from the 
university.112  In ruling that the case was moot, the court reasoned that 
because the students’ complaint only asked for declaratory and 
injunctive relief, and did not ask for damages, the students lacked a 
“cognizable interest” in any requested relief.113  
In contrast to the plaintiffs in Fox, but similar to the plaintiffs in 
Mellon and American Humanist Association, Gavin made a claim for 
damages in his complaint114 and in his amended complaint.115 
Therefore, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
                                                
105 Id. at 375–76. Nonetheless, the defendant was not required to pay 
damages due to being immune under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a 
doctrine not at issue in the Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board case. 
See id. at 376–77. 
106 Am. Humanist Assn. v. Greenville Cty. Sch. Dist., 652 F. App’x 224, 228 
(4th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). 
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 See Fox v. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ., 42 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 1994). 
111 Id. at 137. 
112 Id. at 139. 
113 Id. at 140 (quoting Cty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 
(1979)).  
114 Complaint, supra note 9, at 15. 
115 Amended Complaint, supra note 47, at 17. 
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Virginia and the Fourth Circuit should find that Gavin’s claim for 
damages based on past violations of his rights is not moot.  
 
B.   Gavin’s Equal Protection and Title IX Rights Were Violated by 
His School 
 
Gavin has strong claims of discrimination both under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Title IX, and, 
as the Seventh Circuit found in Whitaker,116 he is likely to succeed on 
both claims. 
 
i.   The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Protects Gavin Grimm and Other Transgender Individuals 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires that Gavin Grimm and other transgender individuals be 
permitted to use bathrooms that correspond to their gender identities. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”117  The Supreme Court has held that this 
clause means that for most unequal treatment, government 
discrimination will be upheld so long as the government can meet a 
“rational basis” test.118  This rational basis test requires only that the 
government be able to show a rational link to a “legitimate” 
governmental interest.119  However, for certain suspect or quasi-suspect 
classifications, the government must meet a higher, heightened scrutiny 
standard before its discrimination will be upheld.120  
For suspect classifications, such as those based on race, national 
origin, and alienage, the government must meet the most demanding 
test, the strict scrutiny test, before its classification will be upheld by a 
court.121  To pass this test, the government must show that its 
classification is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental 
                                                
116 Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 
1034 (7th Cir. 2017). 
117 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
118 See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 108 (1949). 
119 See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (stating that non-suspect 
classifications must only “be rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.”); Ry. Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 110 (establishing that a 
classification in the law must have a “relation to the purpose for which it was 
made”). 
120 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 221 (2000). 
121 See, e.g., id. at 227 (1995); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).  
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interest.122  For quasi-suspect classifications, such as sex or illegitimacy, 
an intermediate scrutiny test applies.123  In order for a court to uphold a 
government classification under the intermediate scrutiny test, the 
government must show that its classification is “substantially related” 
to “important governmental objectives”.124  The Supreme Court has held 
that under the intermediate scrutiny test, the government has the burden 
of showing “an exceedingly persuasive justification” for the 
discrimination.125 
Bathroom policies that require people to use bathrooms that 
correspond with the sex they were assigned at birth discriminate against 
transgender people because under such policies, transgender people are 
not permitted to use bathrooms that correspond to their gender identity, 
whereas non-transgender people are permitted to use bathrooms that 
correspond to their gender identity.  This discrimination should be 
judged with heightened scrutiny for two independent reasons: 1) 
discrimination against transgender individuals should be judged with 
heightened scrutiny; and 2) discrimination against transgender 
individuals is sex discrimination and sex discrimination must be judged 
with heightened scrutiny.126  Judged with heightened scrutiny, 
transgender bathroom restrictions should be found in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
a.   Discrimination Against Transgender Individuals Should Be 
Judged with Heightened Scrutiny 
 
Discrimination against transgender individuals should be judged 
with heightened scrutiny.  In order to decide whether discrimination 
against a particular group should be judged with heightened scrutiny 
(either strict or intermediate scrutiny), courts look at: 1) whether the 
group has suffered from historic discrimination;127 2) whether the 
characteristic of the group is related to ability to perform or contribute 
                                                
122 See Adarand Constructors, 528 U.S. at 227.  
123 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 
259, 265 (1978). 
124 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.  
125 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); see also 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–534 (1996) (finding a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because no “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” for excluding women from the Virginia 
Military Institute) (internal quotation omitted). 
126 Craig, 429 U.S. at 218. 
127 See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987). 
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to society;128 3) whether the characteristic of the group is “obvious, 
immutable, or distinguishing;”129 and 4) whether the group is politically 
weak.130  
All four factors weigh in favor of applying heightened scrutiny to 
transgender discrimination because: 1) transgender individuals have 
suffered and continue to suffer terrible discrimination in our society; 2) 
transgender status is unrelated to the ability to perform in or contribute 
to our society; 3) transgender status is an obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing characteristic that defines a discrete group, and in any 
event, is not a characteristic that a person should have to change in order 
to be treated equally in society; and 4) transgender individuals are a 
small minority of the overall population, and thus are politically weak. 
Thus, examining these four factors, it is clear that discrimination against 
transgender individuals should be judged with heightened scrutiny, as 
several courts have already determined,131 including the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia in the recent case of Doe 1 v. 
Trump, where the Court blocked President Trump’s attempted ban of 
transgender individuals in the military.132  
 Transgender	  individuals	  have	  suffered	  and	  continue	  to	  suffer	  from	  historic	  discrimination.	  
 
As several courts have recognized, transgender individuals have 
experienced and are experiencing discrimination at alarming rates.133 
                                                
128 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985).  
129 Bowen, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987). 
130 Id.  
131 See, e.g., Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 140 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that “transgender people are a quasi-suspect 
class”); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 
208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (finding heightened scrutiny 
appropriate to analyze discrimination against transgender student). 
132 Doe 1 v. Trump, CV 17-1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, at *27–28 
(D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017). 
133 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 
F.3d 1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017) (“There is no denying that transgender 
individuals face discrimination, harassment, and violence because of their 
gender identity.”); Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (“[T]ransgender people 
have suffered a history of persecution and discrimination.”); Sandy E. James, 
Jody L. Herman, Susan Rankin, Mara Keisling, Lisa Mottet, & Ma’ayan 
Anafi The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 65 (2016), 
http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-
FINAL.PDF [hereinafter 2015 Transgender Survey]. 
260    Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice    [Vol. 6:2 
 
Discrimination is widespread in family homes, employment, housing, 
healthcare access and public accommodations.134  According to a recent 
survey done by the National Center for Transgender Equality, 
approximately one in ten transgender individuals have been physically 
assaulted in the past year because they are transgender, and more than 
three quarters of transgender children out at school have been mistreated 
at school because of their transgender status.135 
 Being	  transgender	  is	  unrelated	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  perform	  or	  contribute	  to	  society.	  
 
The Ninth Circuit stated in United States v. De Gross, that 
“[g]ender bears no relationship to an individual’s ability to perform or 
contribute to society.”136  Similarly, another court notes “there is 
obviously no relationship between transgender status and the ability to 
contribute to society.”137  Additionally, the psychological profession 
recognizes that there is no inherent detriment to functioning in society 
by virtue of being transgender.138  Transgender people function in all 
parts of society: they are elite athletes, members of the military, and 
politicians, among other things.139 
 
                                                
134 NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: STATE 
REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 
(2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/injustice-every-turn-state-reports-
national-transgender-discrimination-survey/.  
135 2015 Transgender Survey, supra note 133, at 4, 45. 
136 United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1992).  
137 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 
F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016). 
138 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013). 
139 See, e.g., Maggie Astor, Danica Roem Wins Virginia Race, Breaking a 
Barrier for Transgender People, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/us/danica-roem-virginia-
transgender.html (noting Danica Roem, a transgender individual who won a 
seat in the Virginia legislature in the 2017 election); Matthew Haag, Caitlyn 
Jenner Slams Trump on Transgender Order: ‘See You in Court’, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/arts/television/caitlyn-
jenner-trump-transgender-bathroom.html (noting that Caitlyn Jenner is a 
transgender individual and an Olympic Gold Medalist); Dave Phillips, Judge 
Blocks Trump’s Ban on Transgender Troops in Military, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 
30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/us/military-transgender-
ban.html (quoting a number of transgender military members). 
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 Being	  transgender	  is	  “obvious,	  immutable,	  or	  distinguishing,”	  and	  in	  any	  event	  is	  an	  extremely	  personal	  characteristic	  that	  a	  person	  should	  not	  have	  to	  change.	  
 
Being transgender is an “immutable, obvious, or distinguishing 
characteristic”140 that often results in discrimination when the 
characteristic is noticed or discovered by others.141  What matters for 
this factor is whether there is a distinguishing characteristic that: 1) 
defines the group, and; 2) often results in discrimination once others 
learn that an individual has the characteristic.142  Being transgender 
certainly fulfils both requirements.  As one court notes “transgender 
people often face backlash in everyday life when their status is 
discovered,” for example when presenting government documents in 
order to assert legal rights, and whenever the gender listed on the 
government document is different than the gender identity of the 
individual.143  Additionally, people should not have to identify with a 
particular sex in order to receive equal protection under the law.144  
 Transgender	  individuals	  make	  up	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  the	  overall	  population	  and	  thus	  are	  politically	  weak.	  
 
The most recent estimate is that less than one percent of the 
United States population is transgender.145  As about one in 170 adults 
in the United States identifies as transgender, for a total of 1.4 million 
                                                
140 Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(quoting Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012)).  
141 See Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 139. 
142 See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 83, aff'd, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (citing Bowen 
v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 
(1976)). 
143 Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 140. 
144 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (finding that “the 
immutability prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is satisfied when the 
identifying trait is so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent 
for government to penalize a person for refusing to change it”) (citations and 
quotations omitted); cf. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008) 
(noting that a person should not have to change their sexual orientation in 
order to receive equal protection under the law).  
145 Andrew R. Flores, et al., How Many Adults Identify as Transgender in the 
United States?, THE WILLIAMS INST. (June 2016), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/How-Many-
Adults-Identify-as-Transgender-in-the-United-States.pdf (noting about .6% 
of adults in the United States identify as transgender, for a total of about 1.4 
million adults in the United States). 
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adults, this is clearly a minority population.146  As one court notes, this 
is a group that is politically weak because they “lack the political 
strength to protect themselves,” as evidenced by the fact that “there is 
no indication that there have ever been any transgender members of the 
United States Congress or the federal judiciary.”147 
Thus, because all four factors used to determine whether 
discrimination against a certain group of people should receive 
heightened scrutiny are present in the case of transgender people, 
heightened scrutiny should apply to the discrimination against 
transgender people present in bathroom restrictions that prohibit 
transgender individuals from using bathrooms that correspond with their 
gender identity. 
 
b.   Discrimination Against Transgender Individuals is Sex 
Discrimination, Which is Already Judged with Heightened 
Scrutiny  
 
Discrimination against transgender individuals is a type of sex 
discrimination, thus, it should be judged with heightened scrutiny. In 
1989, the Supreme Court held, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,148 that 
discrimination because someone does not conform to sex stereotypes is 
sex discrimination.149  Price Waterhouse involved Title VII, which 
prohibits employment discrimination “because of . . . sex,”150 a 
provision that numerous courts have noted is similar to Title IX’s 
prohibition of discrimination “on the basis of sex.”151  In Price 
                                                
146 See id.  
147 Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 140. 
148 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
149 Six members of the Supreme Court agreed that discrimination based upon 
failure to conform to sex stereotypes was sex discrimination. Id. at 258 (four 
justice plurality opinion); Id. at 258–61, (White, J., concurring); Id. at 272–
73 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
150  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012). 
151 See, e.g., Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(examining “case law interpreting Title VII . . . for guidance in evaluating a 
claim brought under Title IX”); G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County 
Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 742 (E.D. Va. 2015) (courts have “routinely 
relied” on Title VII cases to decide Title IX cases), rev'd in part, vacated in 
part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 
(2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local 
Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 868 (S.D. Ohio 2016) 
(noting that Title VII’s provision prohibiting sex discrimination is an “analog 
provision” to Title IX’s provision prohibiting sex discrimination); Dawn L. 
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Waterhouse, a female accountant was denied a promotion at least in part 
because she was too masculine in the eyes of her colleagues.152 In her 
promotion evaluations, she was described as “macho” and one comment 
suggested that she should “take a course at charm school.”153  When 
Hopkins was given an explanation as to why she did not receive a 
promotion, Hopkins was told she should “walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.”154  The Supreme Court noted that “[i]n the 
specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis 
of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, 
has acted on the basis of gender.”155  Therefore, the Court found that 
because Hopkins had been discriminated against because of failure to 
conform to sex stereotypes, she had shown sex discrimination.156  
Since Price Waterhouse, many courts have recognized that 
discriminating against a transgender person because they are 
transgender is sex stereotyping and thus is sex discrimination. 
Transgender individuals are those people “whose gender identity or 
expression differs from what is associated with the gender they were 
thought to be at birth.”157  It is a sex stereotype that a person born 
identified as a girl will grow up identifying as a girl and then a woman, 
and conform to stereotypes of what girls and women should look like 
and be like.  Similarly, it is a sex stereotype that a person born identified 
as a boy will grow up identifying as a boy and then a man, and conform 
to stereotypes of what boys and men should look like and be like.  A 
transgender person is usually158 a person who is born identified as a girl, 
who grows up identifying as a boy and then a man, and conforms to at 
least some stereotypes of what boys and men should look like and be 
like; or, a person who is born identified as a boy who grows up 
identifying as a girl and then a woman, and conforms to at least some 
stereotypes of what girls and women should look like and be like.  Thus, 
transgender people, by definition, are people who do not conform to 
                                                
v. Greater Johnstown Sch. Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 332, 381 (W.D. Pa. 2008) 
(“Title IX freely borrows the jurisprudence of Title VII.”). 
152 490 U.S. at 255. 
153 Id. at 235. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 250. 
156 See id. at 258. 
157 2015 Transgender Survey, supra note 133, at 40. 
158 Id. at 5 (reporting that 2/3 of transgender people have a consistent identity 
as either male or female, while 1/3 are “non-binary” and do not identify as 
either male or female all the time). 
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certain sex stereotypes, described above.159  Therefore, discriminating 
against a transgender person because they are transgender is 
discrimination based on failure to conform to sex stereotypes, which is 
sex discrimination. 
Indeed, since Price Waterhouse, and relying on Price Waterhouse, 
five United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have already recognized that 
discrimination against a person because they are transgender is 
discrimination because of sex.  
In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
recognized this in Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co.,160 when a 
plaintiff made a claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA),161 which prohibits discrimination in credit transactions “on the 
basis of . . . sex.”162  The plaintiff alleged that the Bank refused him a 
loan application because he was a man dressed in feminine attire.163 
Reasoning that in Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that 
“stereotyped remarks [including statements about dressing more 
‘femininely’] can certainly be evidence” of sex discrimination,164 the 
First Circuit found that the plaintiff had stated a valid claim of sex 
discrimination under the ECOA.165  
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
recognized that discrimination against a transgender individual is sex 
discrimination in Smith v. City of Salem.166  In Smith, the plaintiff 
alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII when he was 
suspended after he began dressing more femininely at work and after he 
had told his supervisor that he identified as a transsexual.167  The Sixth 
Circuit held that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled a case of sex 
discrimination under both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause of 
                                                
159 See also Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 
F.3d 1034, 1048 (7th Cir. 2017) (“By definition, a transgender individual 
does not conform to the sex-based stereotypes of the sex that he or she was 
assigned at birth.”) (citing Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 
2011)); Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 F. App’x 883, 884 
(11th Cir. 2016). 
160 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000). 
161 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691(a)–(f) (2012). 
162 Rosa, 214 F.3d at 215 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)). 
163 Rosa, 214 F.3d at 214. 
164 Id. at 216 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 
(1989) (brackets in original)). 
165 Id. 
166 378 F.3d 566, 573–75 (6th Cir. 2004). 
167 Id. Transsexual is an older term used for some in the transgender 
community.  See Glossary of Terms–Transgender, GLAAD, 
https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). 
2017]                     TRANSGENDER BATHROOM RIGHTS                               265  
 
the Fourteenth Amendment and overturned the District Court’s 
dismissal of his case.168  The Sixth Circuit noted that earlier cases 
holding that transgender individuals were not protected from 
discrimination under Title VII had been overruled by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse.169  The Smith Court reasoned 
that: 
 
After Price Waterhouse, an employer who 
discriminates against women because, for instance, 
they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in 
sex discrimination because the discrimination would 
not occur but for the victim's sex.  It follows that 
employers who discriminate against men because 
they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act 
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, 
because the discrimination would not occur but for 
the victim's sex.170 
 
As discussed above,171 in 2017, in Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified 
School District No. 1 Board of Education, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that discrimination against a 
transgender student was sex discrimination in violation of Title IX and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.172  In 
determining that discrimination against a transgender student was sex 
discrimination and thus heightened scrutiny should apply to the 
analysis, the Seventh Circuit noted that “[by] definition, a transgender 
individual does not conform to the sex-based stereotypes of the sex that 
he or she was assigned at birth.”173  Thus, citing Price Waterhouse, the 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that because discrimination against a 
transgender individual is discrimination based on sex stereotypes, 
discrimination against a transgender individual is prohibited sex 
discrimination.174 
                                                
168 Smith, 378 F.3d at 572, 575, 577. 
169 Id. at 572–73 (noting that Price Waterhouse had overruled the reasoning 
in: Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that transgender people are not protected by Title VII); Holloway v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661–63 (9th Cir. 1977) (same); and 
Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (same). 
170 Smith, 378 F.3d at 574. 
171 See supra notes 38-66 and accompanying text. 
172 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017); supra notes 44–73 and accompanying text. 
173 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048. 
174 Id.  
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In 2000, in Schwenk v. Hartford, the United States Court of 
Appeal for the Ninth Circuit found that the Gender Motivated Violence 
Act (GMVA), which prohibits “crime[s] of violence committed because 
of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus 
based on the victim's gender,”175 was a parallel statute to Title VII and 
thus the logic and reasoning of Price Waterhouse applied.   
In Schwenk, a transgender woman was sexually assaulted in 
prison by a male prison guard because she was a transgender woman.176 
In deciding that the plaintiff had stated a claim under the GMVA, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that in Price Waterhouse the Supreme Court “held 
that Title VII barred not just discrimination based on the fact that 
Hopkins was a woman, but also discrimination based on the fact that 
she failed “to act like a woman”—that is, to conform to socially-
constructed gender expectations.”177  The court also noted that “under 
Price Waterhouse, ‘sex’ under Title VII encompasses both sex—that is, 
the biological differences between men and women—and gender. 
Discrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or 
woman is forbidden under Title VII.”178  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that because the GMVA and Title VII were parallel statutes 
and the plaintiff had shown that the assault was motivated at least in part 
by her gender because it was motivated by “her assumption of a 
feminine rather than a typically masculine appearance or demeanor,” 
the plaintiff had stated a claim under the GMVA.179 
Finally, in 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit recognized that discrimination against transgender 
individuals is sex discrimination in Glenn v. Brumby.180  In Glenn, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that a state government office violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause when it fired a 
transgender employee because she was transgender.181  In affirming 
summary judgment for the government employee, the Eleventh Circuit 
applied heightened scrutiny because it noted that “discrimination 
against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity 
is sex discrimination.”182  
                                                
175 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 13981(c)). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 1201–02. 
178 Id.  
179 Id. at 1202. 
180 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). 
181 Id. at 1316. 
182 Id. at 1317. 
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Other lower level courts have also found that discrimination 
against transgender individuals is sex discrimination.183  For example, 
on October 30, 2017, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, in blocking President Trump’s attempt to ban transgender 
individuals from military service, found that discrimination against 
transgender individuals is a form of sex discrimination, and must 
therefore pass the intermediate scrutiny test.184  Thus, discrimination 
against transgender individuals is sex discrimination and merits the 
heightened review given to sex discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
In addition, discrimination based on sex is discrimination where sex 
is taken into account to mete out different rights and responsibilities.185 
Therefore, when a school decides what bathrooms an individual should 
use based on any judgment about their sex, it discriminates based on 
sex.  As the Seventh Circuit stated in Whitaker, “the School District’s 
policy cannot be stated without referencing sex, as the School District 
decides which bathroom a student may use based upon the sex listed on 
the student’s birth certificate.  This policy is inherently based upon a 
sex-classification and heightened review applies.”186 
 
                                                
183 See, e.g., Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (discrimination against a transgender plaintiff is sex discrimination); 
Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 527 (D. Conn. 2016) 
(holding that discrimination “on the basis of being transgender, or intersex, 
or sexually indeterminate, constitutes discrimination on the basis of the 
properties or characteristics typically manifested in sum as male and 
female—and that discrimination is literally discrimination ‘because of 
sex.’”). 
184 Doe 1 v. Trump, CV 17-1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, at *28 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 30, 2017). 
185 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (finding prohibited 
sex discrimination when a statutory scheme gave different benefits to male 
service-members than it gave to female service-members). 
186 Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 
1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017). This argument leads to the question: is it 
prohibited sex discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment to separate 
people by sex for bathroom use?  I have previously argued that it is, but that 
argument is beyond the scope of this article.   See Catherine Jean Archibald, 
Transgender Student in Maine May Use Bathroom that Matches Gender 
Identity - Are Co-ed Bathrooms Next? 83 UMKC L. REV. 57–71 (2014) 
(arguing that sex-segregated bathrooms violate the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Catherine Jean Archibald, De-Clothing Sex-Based Classifications - Same-Sex 
Marriage Is Just the Beginning: Achieving Formal Sex Equality in the 
Modern Era, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 1 (2009) (same). 
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c.   Judged with Heightened Scrutiny, the Transgender Bathroom 
Restrictions Cannot Stand. 
 
Policies requiring people to use bathrooms that correspond to the 
sex they were identified as at birth discriminates against transgender 
people.  To see why, consider the following: Transgender people, by 
definition, do not identify with the sex they were identified as at birth.187 
Non-transgender people, by definition, do identify with the sex they 
were identified as at birth.  Thus, requiring people to use bathrooms that 
correspond to the sex they were identified as at birth means that while 
non-transgender people may use bathrooms that correspond with the 
gender that they identify with, transgender people may not.  Imagine 
being only allowed to use a bathroom corresponding with a gender you 
do not identify with.  This state of affairs leads to stress, anxiety, 
depression, and increased suicide risk in transgender people.188  Under 
such policies, many transgender people avoid using any bathroom at all, 
by limiting their food and liquid intake, and by “holding it” if they do 
need to use the bathroom, actions which are bad for their health.189 
Because bathroom policies discriminate against transgender people, 
and because discrimination against transgender people is only 
permissible if the discrimination can pass heightened scrutiny, as 
discussed above, courts considering the issue must consider whether the 
discrimination against transgender people is “substantially related” to 
an “important” government interest.190  Additionally, under the 
intermediate scrutiny test, the government has the burden of showing 
                                                
187 See supra notes 11, 157, and accompanying text (most transgender people 
either: identify as male, but were identified at birth as female; or, identify as 
female, but were identified at birth as male). 
188 See, e.g., Kristie L. Seelman, Transgender Adults’ Access to College 
Bathrooms and Housing and the Relationship to Suicidality, 63 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 1378 (2016), 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00918369.2016.1157998 
(finding more than 15% chance increase in suicide among those transgender 
people who had been denied access to bathrooms matching their gender 
identity compared with those who had not been denied such access); 2015 
Transgender Survey, supra note 133, at 7 (documenting increased rate of 
harm to transgender people when their community does not affirm in their 
gender identity). 
189 See, e.g., 2015 Transgender Survey, supra note 133, at 17 (finding that 
over half of transgender people have avoided using a public restroom in the 
past year for fear of encountering hostility, and that such avoidance leads to 
health problems). 
190 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
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“an exceedingly persuasive justification” for the discrimination.191 In 
addition, “The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or 
invented post hoc in response to litigation.  And it must not rely on 
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or 
preferences of males and females.”192 
Schools requiring that transgender students use bathrooms that 
correspond with the sex they were identified with at birth cannot meet 
their burden of showing “an exceedingly persuasive justification” for 
the discrimination.  Schools wanting to maintain the discriminatory 
policies usually proffer two justifications for their policies: 1) safety of 
students; 2) privacy of students.193 Neither justification is persuasive. 
 Safety	  justifications	  are	  not	  persuasive.	  
Schools seeking to justify bathroom policies that prevent 
transgender people from accessing bathrooms corresponding to the 
gender that they identify with often assert that they are necessary to 
protect women and girls from assault by biological males who will 
pretend to be transgender in order to enter an all-female space in order 
to assault women and girls.194  However, this fear is unfounded. School 
administrators who come from schools and school districts that already 
allow transgender youth to use bathrooms that correspond to the gender 
identity have filed an amici brief in the Grimm case.195  These 
administrators work in 33 different states and the District of Columbia, 
and their schools collectively educate over 2.1 million youth.196  These 
amici note that, in their experience, none over the fears over safety have 
materialized.197  As one sheriff from Washington state points out: 
                                                
191 Id. (finding a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because no 
exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding women from the Virginia 
Military Institute). 
192 Id. 
193 See, e.g., Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., CV 2:16-01537, 2017 WL 
770619, at *5, *14 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2017) (noting that the objections to 
inclusive bathroom policies stemmed from a fear that “a student would in 
essence masquerade as being transgender, and would then use a designated 
student restroom inconsistent with their assigned sex” and include privacy 
concerns and safety concerns). 
194 See, e.g., id. 
195 Brief of Amici Curiae School Administrators from Thirty-One States and 
the District of Columbia in Support of Respondent at 3, Gloucester Cty Sch. 
Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (No. 16-273) (2017) [Hereinafter 
Amici Brief of School Administrators]. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 4. 
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“We’ve protected gay and transgender people from discrimination in 
Washington for 10 years, with no increase in public safety incidents as 
a result.  It’s important to remember that indecent exposure, voyeurism, 
and sexual assault, are already illegal, and police use those laws to keep 
people safe.”198 Privacy	  justifications	  are	  not	  persuasive.	  
Schools seeking to justify bathroom policies that prevent 
transgender people from accessing bathrooms corresponding to the 
gender that they identify with often assert that these policies are 
necessary to protect the privacy of other students.199  However, this 
concern is unfounded. Indeed, several courts have noted that when 
transgender students use the bathrooms that corresponded with their 
gender identity, the privacy of other students is not disturbed.200 
Similarly, amici in schools that already have transgender inclusive 
                                                
198 Amicus Curiae Brief for the States of New York, et al., as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 16, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. 
Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (No. 16–273) (2017) (quoting David Crary, Debate 
Over Transgender Bathroom Access Spreads Nationwide, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
(May 10, 2016). See also Evancho, 2017 WL 770619, at *15 (noting that the 
“existing disciplinary rules of the [school] District and the [state] laws” 
already forbid “‘peeping Tom’ activity by anyone pretending to be 
transgender”). 
199 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 
F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 2017). 
200 Id. (“For nearly six months, Ash [the transgender student] used the boys’ 
bathroom while at school and school-sponsored events without incident or 
complaint from another student.  In fact, it was only when a teacher 
witnessed Ash washing his hands in the restroom that his bathroom usage 
once more became an issue in the School District’s eyes.”); Evancho, 2017 
WL 770619, at *37 (“[G]iven the actual physical layout of the student 
restrooms at the High School, it would appear to the Court that anyone using 
the toilets or urinals at the High School is afforded actual physical privacy 
from others viewing their external sex organs and excretory functions.  
Conversely, others in the restrooms are shielded from such views.”); Bd. of 
Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 
3d 850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (“[T]he Court notes that Highland Elementary 
students use sex-segregated bathrooms with stall dividers that open on the 
top and bottom by approximately two feet. . . .  There is no evidence that 
Jane herself, if allowed to use the girls' restroom, would infringe upon the 
privacy rights of any other students.  Therefore, Third-Party Defendants have 
failed to put forth an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification,’ or even a rational 
one, for preventing Jane from using the girls' restroom.”). 
2017]                     TRANSGENDER BATHROOM RIGHTS                               271  
 
policies note that privacy concerns have not materialized in their 
schools.201  As the Seventh Circuit noted in Whitaker,  
 
A transgender student’s presence in the restroom 
provides no more of a risk to other students’ privacy 
rights than the presence of an overly curious student of 
the same biological sex who decides to sneak glances at 
his or her classmates performing their bodily functions. 
Or for that matter, any other student who uses the 
bathroom at the same time.  Common sense tells us that 
the communal restroom is a place where individuals act 
in a discreet manner to protect their privacy and those 
who have true privacy concerns are able to utilize a stall. 
Nothing in the record suggests that the bathrooms at 
Tremper High School are particularly susceptible to an 
intrusion upon an individual’s privacy.  Further, if the 
School District’s concern is that a child will be in the 
bathroom with another child who does not look 
anatomically the same, then it would seem that separate 
bathrooms also would be appropriate for pre-pubescent 
and post-pubescent children who do not look alike 
anatomically. But the School District has not drawn this 
line.  Therefore, this court agrees with the district court 
that the School District’s privacy arguments are 
insufficient to establish an exceedingly persuasive 
justification for the classification.202 
 Inclusive	  bathroom	  policies	  are	  beneficial	  to	  everyone.	  
As the Gloucester amici point out, their collective experience is 
that inclusive bathroom policies create a positive environment for all 
students because students learn from their schools how to treat others 
who are different than them.203  Additionally, respecting students’ 
gender identity is comforting for all students because students know that 
if others are respected and treated with dignity, they will be too.204 As 
one educator states:  
 
Respecting students’ gender identity eliminates the 
disruption that results from singling out, stigmatizing, 
                                                
201 Amici Brief of School Administrators, supra note 195, at 9–11. 
202 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1052. 
203 Amici Brief of School Administrators, supra note 195, at 16. 
204 Id. at 5. 
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and discriminating against transgender students, and 
avoids disrupting the normal social interactions involved 
in use of communal facilities.  By contrast, refusing to 
respect a student’s gender identity is “toxic for the 
student – it says ‘you are not welcome,’ every day.205  
 
ii.    Title IX Protects Gavin Grimm and Other Transgender 
Individuals 
 
The Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court should interpret Title 
IX as requiring that schools allow students, employees, alumni, and 
others who use school buildings and facilities for school-related events, 
to use bathrooms that match their gender identity.  Title IX requires that 
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”206  “Program or activity” is defined as 
including “all of the operations of . . . a local educational agency . . . [or] 
school system.”207 
Because Title IX prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex,” 
the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court should find that forbidding a 
person to use a bathroom that aligns with that person’s gender identity, 
simply because of the person’s sex, is prohibited discrimination “on the 
basis of sex,” in violation of Title IX.  Title IX and its regulations allow 
schools to have separate boys’ and girls’ bathrooms.208  However, the 
statute and its regulations are silent on which bathrooms transgender 
individuals should use. 
For all the reasons, discussed above, discriminating against 
transgender individuals by not permitting them to access the bathrooms 
that correspond to their gender identity, when all other students may 
access bathrooms that correspond to their gender identity, is sex 
discrimination.  Therefore, since Title IX prohibits discrimination “on 
the basis of sex,” the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court should find 
that bathroom policies that prohibit transgender individuals from using 
bathrooms that match their gender identity are in violation of Title IX. 
 
                                                
205 Id. at 6 (quoting Interview with Robert A. Motley (Oct. 11, 2016)). 
206 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
207 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2012). 
208 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (1994) (“A recipient may provide separate toilet, 
locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities 
provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities 
provided for students of the other sex.”). 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Court should decide Gavin’s case in his favor. The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and 
probably the Fourth Circuit (should the losing party appeal) must make 
a decision in Gavin’s case.  Once they do, it is likely that the losing party 
will appeal to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court may or may not 
decide to hear the case.  There is good reason for it to take this case as 
there is currently a circuit split on the transgender bathroom issue. On 
one side, the Seventh Circuit recently upheld the grant of a preliminary 
injunction requiring a school to allow a transgender student to use the 
bathrooms that he identifies with.209  Additionally, the Sixth Circuit 
recently denied a stay application from a school seeking to stay the grant 
of a preliminary injunction requiring a school to permit a transgender 
student to use the bathrooms that she identifies with.210  On the other 
hand, in an older case, the Tenth Circuit held that discrimination against 
a transsexual is not sex discrimination under Title VII, and that an 
employer may fire a transsexual for using the “wrong” bathroom.211 
Even if the Supreme Court chooses not to decide Gavin’s case, as long 
as the law is unsettled, as it currently is, there will doubtless be a future 
court case on the same issue that the Supreme Court will decide to hear. 
When it does, for the reasons discussed in this article, it should decide 
in the transgender students’ favor. 
  
                                                
209 Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 
1034 (7th Cir. 2017). 
210 See Dodds v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 845 F.3d 217 (6th Cir. 2016). 
211 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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